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THE MERITS OF “MERITS” REVIEW: A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT
THE AUSTRALIAN ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Michael Asimow*
Jeffrey S. Lubbers**
This article compares several systems of administrative adjudication. In the
U.S., adjudication is typically performed by the same agency that makes and
enforces the rules. However, in Australia, almost all administrative
adjudication is performed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal [AAT], a
non-specialized adjudicating agency, and several other specialized tribunals
that are independent of the enforcing agency. These tribunals (which evolved
out of concerns about separation of powers) have achieved great legitimacy. In
the U.K., recent legislation [the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement
Act] merged numerous specialized tribunals into a single first-tier tribunal
with much stronger guarantees of independence than previously existed. An
upper tribunal hears appeals from the first tier and largely supplants judicial
review. The article concludes by asking whether the U.S. could learn anything
from the Australian and U.K. experience and suggests that a single tribunal
to adjudicate federal benefits cases might be a significant improvement over the
existing model.
Cet article compare un certain nombre de systèmes de règlement judiciaire de
différends dans le domaine administratif. Aux Etats-Unis, typiquement, le
règlement de différends est effectué par la même agence qui établit les règles et
qui les met en application. Toutefois, en Australie, presque tous ces règlements
sont effectués par le Administrative Appeals Tribunal [AAT], une agence
non-spécialisée de règlement de différends, ainsi qu‟un certain nombre d‟autres
tribunaux spécialisés qui sont indépendants de l‟agence qui met les règles en
application. Ces tribunaux (qui émanent de préoccupations au sujet de la
séparation des pouvoirs) ont atteint un niveau élevé de légitimité. Au
Royaume-Uni, une loi récente [la Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement
Act] a fusionné plusieurs tribunaux spécialisés en un seul tribunal de
première instance ayant des garanties d‟indépendance bien plus fortes
qu‟auparavant. Un tribunal supérieur juge les appels des décisions du tribunal
de première instance et supplante largement la révision judiciaire. L‟article se
termine en posant la question à savoir si les Etats-Unis pourraient apprendre
quelque chose de l‟expérience australienne et britannique et suggère qu‟un seul
tribunal pour juger les cas de bénéfices fédéraux pourrait constituer une
amélioration importante par rapport au modèle existant.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Modern governments have to decide many disputes arising out of regulation or
benefit schemes. There are various models of administrative dispute resolution
available. The disputes can be adjudicated by a national court system or within the
agency that made the initial decision but subject to judicial review. A third way is
adjudication by specialized courts or tribunals. The United States relies heavily, but
not exclusively, on adjudication within its agencies, while Australia and the United
Kingdom rely on national administrative appeal tribunals. This article discusses these
different approaches.
II. U.S., AUSTRALIAN AND U.K. APPROACHES TO ADMINISTRATIVE
ADJUDICATION
A. Administrative Adjudication in the U.S.
At the federal level, the U.S. has generally avoided establishing specialized courts,
although a few have been created and some continue to exist. Most disputes
involving the government are resolved within regulatory and benefit agencies, not by
courts. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld administrative adjudication in 1932, and in
1946 Congress responded by enacting the Administrative Procedure Act [APA]. At that
time, administrative adjudication was viewed largely as the vehicle for agency
implementation of regulatory statutes such as those relating to energy, transportation,
communications, securities, or labour law. Such policy-oriented adjudication still
continues, although most of it has been supplanted by agency rules that resolve the
issues across-the-board rather than through case-by-case decisionmaking. Today, the
great majority of federal agency adjudication relates to benefit statutes such as social
security.
The APA contains provisions for trial-type procedures for on-the-record agency
hearings required by statute. Specially qualified, quasi-independent adjudicators, who
are now called administrative law judges [ALJs], preside over these formal
adjudications. The APA calls for separation of functions between decisionmakers
and agency prosecutors or investigators. Although the rules of evidence are relaxed
and cross-examination may be limited, these hearings resemble courtroom trials. The
ALJ writes the initial decision in the case but there may be internal agency appellate
review (by the agency head or a delegate of the agency head). Judicial review (on
legal, factual, and discretionary issues) is available in the federal courts, but such
review is deferential and is based on the administrative record, not on a new record
made in court. In this manner, a fair hearing is provided inside the agency.
Federal agencies also conduct a vast range of “informal” adjudication that is not
governed by the APA. Some of it (such as immigration disputes) entails relatively
formal trial-type hearings that are presided over by an administrative judge [AJ],
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See Paul R. Verkuil & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, “Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review of Social
Security Disability Cases” (2003) 55 Admin L Rev 731 at 744-48 (discussing past and existing
specialized courts).
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), discussed further at text accompanying notes 54-55.
As of September 2008, there were 1469 federal ALJs, 1219 of them employed by the Social Security
Administration. Office of Personnel Management chart, “CDPF Status Report as of September
2008,” on file with the authors.
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rather than an ALJ. Even in informal adjudication, agencies generally craft “some
kind of hearing” and judicial review proceeds in a similar way.
4

B. Administrative Adjudication in Australia
1. Internal Review
In Australia, adjudication by Commonwealth ministries and agencies is not
governed by an APA-like code, but instead by provisions in individual statutes and by
the common law principles of “natural justice,” roughly similar to U.S. due process.
As with U.S. informal adjudication, the variety of first-level decisions is so great that
it makes any generalization about the application of natural justice principles difficult.
Commonwealth agencies maintain a variety of different systems of internal review
of decisions unfavorable to private parties under regulatory or benefit statutes. Most
(but not all) of the internal review systems are provided for by statute. Generally,
agencies provide an opportunity for an internal merits review by an official who was
not involved in the initial decision. The review process often furnishes an
opportunity for written submission and sometimes involves an opportunity for an
oral contact in person or over the phone between the private party and the reviewer,
although not a formal hearing. In addition, reviewers usually contact the primary
decisionmaker to discuss the facts and reasons for the decision. Reviewers will
inform the private party of the outcome of the review decision and of the availability
of external review. In many cases, it is necessary for the private party to exhaust the
internal review process before seeking external review before a tribunal.
For example, in social security cases, claimants are encouraged (but not required)
to request reconsideration from the primary decisionmaker. If that fails, they must
seek review of the disputed decision by the Authorized Review Officer [ARO] before
proceeding to a tribunal – in this case the specialized Social Security Appeals Tribunal
[SSAT]. Review by the ARO generally involves a meeting (or at least a phone
conversation) with the applicant, the opportunity to submit additional evidence, and a
statement of the reasons why the ARO has refused to change the decision.
5

2. External Review in Tribunals
Australian administrative tribunals at the federal level are independent of the
primary decisionmaker. Their task in conducting “merits review” is to “examin[e]
whether a decision is substantively correct, after consideration of all relevant issues of
law, fact, policy and discretion.” Merits review means that the tribunal “stands in the
6
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See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S 565, 579 (1975) (“some kind of hearing” required before short-term
suspension of student from school). A fair hearing is required by the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment whenever agency action deprives a person of life, liberty or property.
The material in this paragraph and the following one is drawn from: Administrative Review Council,
Report to the Attorney General: Internal Review of Agency Decision Making (Report No. 44, Nov. 2000).
For useful authorities see Peter Cane, Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication (Oxford and Portland,
Oregon: Hart, 2009); Peter Cane, “Understanding Administrative Adjudication” in Linda Pearson,
Carol Harlow & Michael Taggart, eds, Administrative Law in a Changing State (Portland: Hart, 2008)
273 [Cane chapter]; Linda Pearson, “Fact-Finding in Administrative Tribunals” in Administrative Law
in A Changing State 301; Robin Creyke, “Administrative Tribunals” in Matthew Groves & H.P. Lee
eds, Australian Administrative Law: Fundamentals, Principles, and Doctrines (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007) 77; and Robin Creyke & John McMillan, Control of Government Action: Text,
Cases and Commentary (Sydney: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005) at 114-179. For an early description,
see Mark Aronson & Nicola Franklin, Review of Administrative Action (Sydney: Law Book, 1987) at 221240.
Creyke & McMillan, ibid at 114.
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shoes” of the agency and is empowered to substitute the “correct or preferable”
decision for that of the agency. Its power extends to substituting decision on issues
of fact, law, and discretion. “Correct” in this formula refers to situations in which the
tribunal considers that there is only one acceptable decision, and “preferable” refers
to situations where it considers that there is more than one acceptable decision.
Tribunal review often entails creation of a fresh evidentiary record including evidence
of facts arising after the original agency decision and it allows the tribunal to reweigh
the relevant factors in exercising discretion.
At the federal level, the “peak” merits review tribunal is the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal [AAT] created in 1976. However, there are more specialized
tribunals in the area of benefits and immigration, including the SSAT, the Veterans‟
Review Board [VRB], the Migration Review Tribunal [MRT], and the Refugee Review
Tribunal [RRT]. In addition, in the economic regulatory area, the Takeovers Panel
reviews decisions by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission involving
corporate takeovers and the Australian Competition Tribunal [ACT, formerly the
Trade Practices Tribunal] reviews decisions of the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission.
The AAT “falls within the portfolio of the Attorney General,” while the
specialized tribunals are within those of the relevant department ministers. Most of
the states have an AAT counterpart and some specialized tribunals as well.
8
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The oft-used “stands in the shoes” metaphor was expressed by Smithers, J. in an important Federal
Court decision. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v. Pochi, (1980) 31 ALR 666, 671.
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 2 ALD 60; 24 ALR 577 (Bowen C.J. and
Deane J.) 149.
Cane, supra note 6 at 149.
Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority, (2008) 248 ALR 390, 397-403 (Kirby J), is typical of cases
that spell out the principles of merits review [Shi]. Shi was a professional license revocation case. It
held that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal [AAT] is permitted to consider new evidence and
determine the “correct or preferable” result based on a fresh factual record including facts arising
after the Authority‟s decision. Moreover, the AAT is empowered to exercise its discretion as to the
appropriate sanction (rather than to remand to the Authority for reconsideration of the sanction). In
Shi the AAT decided to “caution” the licensee rather than revoking his license. It also imposed a
scheme of probation; the power to impose the probationary condition on the caution arose from an
amendment to the statute enacted after the date the Authority acted but before the AAT acted. Ibid
at 403-07.
It was created by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, current version available online:
Comlaw <http://www.com-law.gov.au/Com-Law/management.nsf/current/by-title/54DB558856AEE672CA256F-710006F886?OpenDocument>.
See Creyke & McMillan, supra note 6 at 121. There is also a National Native Title Tribunal, whose
function is to determine initial eligibility and then provide a forum for mediation of applications for
native title that have been filed in federal court. If no agreement is reached, the application may have
to be determined by the court following a trial. See online: National Native Title Tribunal
<http://www.nn-tt.gov.au/What-Is-Native-Title/Pages/Approaches-to-Native-Title.aspx>.
See online: Australian Government <http://www.takeovers.gov.au/about.aspx#role>; AttorneyGeneral v. Alinta Ltd. (2008)233 CLR 542, discussed in infra note 76 [Alinta].
See online: Australian Government <http://www.competitiontribunal.gov.au/>; Tasmanian Breweries
decision, discussed in infra notes 69, 75.
See “About the AAT” online: Australian Government <http://www.aat.gov.au/About-TheAAT/Introduction-ToTheAAT.htm>.
Creyke & McMillan, supra note 6 at 123-26.
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(a) The AAT
As of January 27, 2010, there were 89 “Members” of the AAT, representing a mix
of part-time and full-time judges, lawyers and lay persons with “expertise in a range of
areas, including accountancy, aviation, engineering, law, medicine, pharmacology,
military affairs, public administration and taxation.” There were 154 staff persons
serving the AAT as of June 30, 2009. The AAT President must be a judge of the
Federal Court. There are nineteen other part-time “Presidential Members” – eight
Federal Court judges and five judges of the Family Court of Australia, and six fulltime Deputy Presidents who must have been enrolled as legal practitioners for at least
five years. There were 63 other members, some of who were senior members and
most of whom were part time. Not all of the non-judicial members need be lawyers.
The AAT achieves some specialization because it is split up into four divisions.
Formally, appointments to the AAT are made by the Governor-General (the
Queen‟s representative in Australia), though in practice they are made on the advice
of the Attorney General. The appointments process is based primarily on informal
and largely unregulated consultation within government and between departments
and tribunals. Federal tribunal members serve for fixed terms of three, five or seven
years with possibility of reappointment. The informal appointments process and the
relative shortness of terms obviously have a bearing on the independence of the
tribunals. AAT members may be removed by Parliament “for „proved misbehavior
or incapacity‟ and must be dismissed for bankruptcy” and salaries are set “by an
independent remuneration tribunal.” This mix of provisions leads Professor Cane to
conclude that the independence of the members of the AAT is better protected than
that of members of the specialist federal merits review tribunals, but much less well
protected than that of court judges. AAT members are also less well protected than
U.S. ALJs, although better protected than most U.S. AJs.
The AAT can review a decision only if a statute so provides but there are over
400 such enactments. The AAT received 6226 applications for review in the 200809 year. During that period, it provided 1393 hearings. Of these, 390 decisions set
aside the decision appealed from, 96 varied the decision, and 907 affirmed the
decision. The most important of the AAT‟s jurisdictions are second-tier hearings in
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The material in this paragraph is drawn from “About the AAT,” supra note 16.
The divisions are the General Administrative, Security Appeals, Taxation Appeals, and Veterans‟
Appeals Divisions. Presidential members can exercise powers in any of the Tribunal‟s divisions,
while other Senior Members and Members may exercise powers only in the division or divisions to
which they have been assigned.
The material in this paragraph is drawn from Cane, supra note 6 at 100, 111-12.
Cane points out that originally immigration cases were in the bailiwick of the AAT, but
“[g]overnment dissatisfaction with the patterns of immigration decision-making by the AAT in the
1980s” led to the creation of the two specialist immigration-related tribunals with no right of appeal
to the AAT. Moreover, these tribunals are “more closely integrated into” the department of
immigration, “a greater proportion of the members lack legal training than is the case in the AAT,”
and their work is “actively managed (by the imposition of performance targets, for instance) in a
way that the work of the members of the AAT is not.” Cane chapter, supra note 6 at 298-99.
See online: Australian Government <http://www.a-a-t.gov.au/Legislation-And-Jurisdiction/
Jurisdiction-List.htm>.
AAT, 2008-09 Annual. Report, ch. 3, online: AAT <http://www.a-a-t.gov.au/Corporate
Publications/annual/Annual-Report-2009.htm>. The vast majority of the cases lodged with
the AAT are resolved without a hearing through a negotiated settlement or a successful ADR
proceeding (usually a pre-hearing conference with the judge) or because the applicant chose to
discontinue them or the AAT dismissed the case. See text infra notes 109-13.
Ibid.
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Social Security and veterans‟ benefits cases (after such matters were heard initially in
the SSRT and VRB) as well as workers‟ compensation and tax disputes.
There are a number of specialized adjudicatory tribunals whose decisions cannot
be reviewed by the AAT (including the MRT, RRT, ACT, Takeovers Panel, and
National Native Title Tribunal).
Although not a court, the AAT functions like one with a full array of prehearing,
ADR, and, if necessary, hearing processes. At the “hearing” stage, while the parties
can agree to a decision “on the papers,” there is a right to a formal adversarial
proceeding, with testimony under oath and a right to be represented by lawyers.
While the tribunal may perform some research on legal issues, it relies on the parties
to elicit the facts, rather than on its own research. However, the ordinary rules of
evidence do not apply, neither party bears the burden of proof, and the respondent
agency must forward a statement of reasons and all relevant documents to the
tribunal. Decisions are supposed to be based on the civil standard “the balance of
probability,” similar to the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in the U.S. The
AAT can set decisions aside for error of law (subject to judicial review). Tribunal
decisions on legal issues do not constitute binding precedent in subsequent tribunal
cases. However, the managerial staffs of tribunals circulate such decisions and strive
for consistency. On the other hand, with respect to fact findings, issue estoppel may
apply if an earlier court or tribunal made a final ruling on an issue of fact.
Finally, section 44 of the AAT Act specifies that “[a] party to a proceeding before
the Tribunal may appeal to the Federal Court of Australia, on a question of law, from
any decision of the Tribunal in that proceeding.” This means, of course, that either
party may appeal. After 1999, some of these cases may be transferred first to the
lower Federal Magistrates Court. A further appeal is possible to the High Court if
special leave is granted.
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(b) The SSAT
The largest specialized Commonwealth tribunal is the SSAT, a statutory body that
conducts merits review of administrative decisions made under the social security law,
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Together these four areas comprise about 85% of the cases heard by the AAT. Ibid. Although the
AAT provides hearings under about 400 different statutes, most of them give rise to very few actual
cases lodged with the AAT.
See text accompanying supra note 13.
See online: AAT <http://www.aat.gov.au/ApplyingToTheAAT/ApplicationProcess.htm>.
See Creyke & McMillan, supra note 6 at 156.
See text at notes 107-09.
See Creyke & McMillan, supra note 6 at 175.
See ibid at 176.
AAT Act para. 44(1).
However, an amendment to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act, para. 44AA, provides that the
Federal Court may not transfer an appeal from the AAT to the Federal Magistrates Court if the
appeal is from a Tribunal decision by a member or a panel containing a member who was a
Presidential Member. See Australian Government <http://www.f-m-c.gov.au/servi-ces/html/
administrative.html>.
The scope of judicial review is a complex issue that is far beyond the scope of the present article.
Suffice it to say that review is usually limited to questions of law or violations of procedural norms;
however, the entire absence of evidence to support the determination is considered to be an error of
law as is a completely irrational decision. For an excellent discussion of these complexities, see
Pearson, supra note 6.
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the family assistance law and other related laws. The SSAT operates as the first tier
of external merits review in the social security appeals system. Further rights of
appeal for all parties to a social security appeal include a full merits review by the
AAT as well as judicial review.
On June 30, 2009, the SSAT had 230 members (41 full-time and 189 part-time).
Most hearing panels consist of two members depending on the nature and complexity
of the application. “The SSAT is „inquisitorial‟ in its approach. Each SSAT panel
takes a fresh look at the matter, including the consideration of events which might
have occurred since the decision being appealed was made.” 38
Applications to the SSAT in 2008-09 totaled 16,319 lodged and 16,668 finalized.
About 25-30% of all appeals lead to a reversal or change. Average time for decision
was about 10 weeks. Appeals to the SSAT are free and travel and accommodation
costs are borne by the Tribunal, with a total average cost per applicant of nearly
$32,700AUS.
35

36
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3. Contrast to the U.S.
In summary, there is a sharp contrast between the U.S. and Australian systems of
administrative adjudication. The U.S. generally provides a hearing inside the agency
that made the initial determination, often but not always before an ALJ. The final
administrative decision is usually reserved to the head of the agency or to an appellate
body within the agency. In contrast, Australian adjudication is provided by an
internal review procedure, followed by a merits review consisting of a trial-type
hearing provided outside the adjudicating agency. Most such hearings are provided by
the SSAT, VRB, RRT, MRT, or the AAT. The AAT is a centralized administrative
tribunal providing review of the decisions of hundreds of agencies (and which
provides a second tier review of SSAT and VRB decisions). Both countries provide
for judicial review of agency or tribunal adjudicatory decisions, but in Australia
judicial review is generally limited to questions of law.
C. Administrative Adjudication in the U.K.
The design of the Australian tribunal system (prior to its redesign in 1976) closely
resembled the U.K. tribunal system. Administrative tribunals date from the dawn of
the British welfare state in the early years of the Twentieth Century (particularly the
National Insurance Act 1911). Policymakers felt that resolution of the huge number of
39
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See the SSAT‟s home page online: SSAT <http://www.ssat.gov.au>.
Most SSAT appeals are now heard by the Federal Magistrates Court. See accompanying text supra
note 33.
Material in this paragraph and the following one is drawn from Social Security Appeals Tribunal, Annual
Report 2008-2009, available online: SSAT <http://www.s-s-a-t.gov.au/iNet/ ssat.nsf/1a2f57b7c6453c8fca-256cb6001-c5def/cdc071f19d8533b3ca25770a000b9831/$FILE/SSAT-%20AR%202008-09.pdf>. This comprehensive report, along with those from previous years, is on the SSAT
website, supra note 35.
SSAT Annual Report, ibid at 19.
See R. E. Wraith & P. G. Hutchesson, Administrative Tribunals (London, Allen & Unwin, 1973) at 3342; Paul Craig, Administrative Law 6th ed (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2008) at 64-69. In fact,
various forms of ad hoc tribunals have existed for centuries in British law. During the 1800s, some
combined-function agencies emerged, but they mostly evolved into tribunals whose only
responsibility was to adjudicate disputes arising out of regulatory legislation. Wraith & Hutchesson,
at 17-28. Yet some still remain that have administrative tasks along with adjudicatory ones. See
Craig at 61 (describing the Gaming Board which has substantial rulemaking and law enforcement
functions along with adjudication of licensing disputes), and ibid. at 72 (describing the Civil Aviation
Authority, which is mostly an administrative body but also adjudicates licensing issues).
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disputes arising out of this legislation should not be assigned to the courts, both
because of the sheer numbers of cases and because the courts were perceived as
being hostile to social legislation. Instead, the dispute resolution function was
assigned to tribunals, meaning administrative units engaged exclusively in adjudication
and outside the regular court system. These tribunals were often staffed with a mix of
lawyers, specialists, and lay people and their proceedings tended to be quite informal.
In general, British tribunals have always provided a form of merits review,
meaning that they conduct a de novo hearing of a matter under dispute and issue a
decision on the merits with little or no deference to the prior departmental decision
(or lower level tribunal decision). Unsurprisingly, Australian lawyers, judges, and
policymakers, who were steeped in British practice, followed suit when they came to
organize their own system of administrative adjudication. It seemed most natural to
them to follow the British practice by creating a new tribunal to deal with the
adjudication generated by each new regulatory or welfare program.
This adaptation from existing British institutions illustrates the “path
dependence” phenomenon in which institutions are built to resemble those already in
existence. It is often more natural and efficient to copy what already exists and
seems to be working tolerably well than to redesign and rebuild institutions from
scratch. This is true even if the older model evolved more or less serendipitously and
the older model is decidedly suboptimal.
In most cases, the disputes adjudicated by British tribunals arose from the
decisions of a specific department of government. Prior to the recent amendments
discussed below, most tribunals were organizationally part of the department whose
decisions they reviewed. The tribunals thus were reliant on that department for
services and other resources. Nevertheless, tribunal members typically regarded
themselves as independent of the department and they did not engage in functions
other than adjudication.
Each new piece of welfare or regulatory legislation created a new tribunal. The
result was a hodgepodge of different tribunals with varying jurisdictions, each with its
own system of appointment of members and procedures. Especially after World War
II, the number of specialized tribunals continued to increase rapidly with little
attempt to achieve consistency either in the organization or procedures of the
tribunals or in the details relating to judicial review of their decisions.
In 1955, the Franks Committee took a fresh look at tribunals. It recommended
the establishment of a Council on Tribunals and also promoted a judicialized model
of tribunal procedure as well as openness, fairness, and impartiality of tribunal
decisionmaking. It recommended that tribunals be required to state reasons for their
decisions. And it favored appeal to a superior tribunal and judicial review on points
40
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The experience with assigning disputes over workers‟ compensation to the courts in the 1890‟s was
quite unsuccessful. See Wraith & Hutchesson, ibid at 28.
Ibid at 129-31.
See generally Oona A. Hathaway, “Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System” (2001) 86 Iowa L Rev 601 at 606-22. Path dependence is often
referred to as the “qwerty” phenomenon. Although the traditional layout of the typewriter and now
computer keyboard is undoubtedly suboptimal, the costs of switching to a new one outweigh the
benefits of doing so. Moreover, someone who introduces a new and much superior keyboard will fail
if customers refuse to adopt the innovation (because the existing keyboard works well enough) and
other competitors make the rational decision to stick with the old keyboard on their products. Ibid at
611-13.
See Wraith & Hutchesson, supra note 39 at 43-44.
See Craig, supra note 39 at 259-61.
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of law. The Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1958 implemented many of the
recommendations of the Franks Committee; although it applied only to certain
tribunals and left many unregulated, it improved tribunal procedure and adopted a
requirement that tribunals give reasons for their decisions. The Tribunals and Inquiries
Act created the Council on Tribunals, which conducted studies of tribunal procedures
and issued numerous recommendations. Meanwhile, the courts began to intensify
judicial review of tribunal decisions. This created a generally satisfactory situation
which remained stable until the close of the century.
The movement toward centralization and upgrading of the U.K. tribunals took a
great leap in 2007 with the enactment of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act
[TCEA], an epochal event in the history of British administrative law. The TCEA
must have been significantly influenced by the successful Australian experiment with
a single centralized administrative tribunal, although it did not go as far in that
direction as the Australian model.
Under the TCEA, the existing tribunals were brought under a single Tribunals
Service. The Tribunals Service provides the necessary resources (such as engaging
staff and acquiring property), thus breaking the long-standing pattern of dependence
of tribunals on the departments whose decisions they reviewed. The TCEA requires
that the Judicial Appointments Commission recommend the appointment of judges
and lay members of tribunals; the actual appointments are made by the Lord
Chancellor. This appointment system thus supplants the prior practice under which
appointments to tribunals were made by departments or ministers. The TCEA also
protects the independence of tribunal members and provides for a Senior President
of Tribunals, a position to be held by a judge who represents the views of tribunal
members to Parliament and the various ministers responsible for specific
departments. The Senior President also is empowered to promulgate practice
directions.
The TCEA grouped the jurisdictions of many (though not all) of the formerly
free-standing specialized tribunals into several “chambers.” These chambers are
referred to as “first-tier tribunals.” The first-tier tribunals adjudicate disputes
between private parties and government under a wide range of regulatory and welfare
statutes. First-tier tribunals can reconsider and correct their own decisions on their
own initiative or on petition of a party.
The TCEA also provide for an Upper Tribunal (which is treated as a court of
record) and is also divided into chambers. The Upper Tribunal provides for appeals
on a point of law from first-tier tribunals (with leave from either the first-tier tribunal
or the Upper Tribunal). The Upper Tribunal can reconsider its own decisions and
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See Wraith & Hutchesson, supra note 39 at 44-45.
Most of the important innovations of the TCEA were recommended by the Leggatt Report of 2000.
See Craig, supra note 39 at 261-63. Craig provides an excellent and complete discussion of the TCEA
reforms. Ibid at 263-283.
The Tribunal Service maintains an excellent website, <http://www.tribunals.gov.uk>. Along with a
wealth of information and updates, it contains the text of the TCEA. In 2010, Asylum and
Immigration chambers were established at both the first-tier and Upper Tribunal levels, in place of
the former Asylum and Immigration Tribunal. The Tribunal Service also administers the
Employment Tribunals which are otherwise not within the first and upper tier structures.
There are, at present, five chambers (most consisting of several “jurisdictions”). See website, ibid.
The Upper Tribunal has four chambers.
The Upper Tribunal has first-instance jurisdiction in complex cases and cases raising issues of general
significance. In British practice, the term “point of law” covers unreasonable applications of law to
fact as well as procedural violations and also may well cover unfair and unreasonable factual and
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grant judicial review of tribunal decisions in the form of a prerogative writ. It can
also award monetary damages. The TCEA provides for a further appeal on an
important point of principle from the Upper Tribunal to the Court of Appeal (but
only if the Upper Tribunal or the Court of Appeal gives leave to appeal).
The TCEA thus brings tribunals and courts into a single integrated adjudicatory
system for the dispensation of procedural justice in administrative law. It severed the
connection between tribunals and the departments whose decisions they review. For
all practical purposes, the TCEA seems to abolish any distinction between tribunals
and courts. In this respect, the TCEA goes much further than Australia in integrating
its tribunals into the judicial system; as we are about to see, Australians would raise
serious constitutional objections to such a move. On the other hand, the Australian
AAT centralizes adjudicatory power into a single adjudicating entity (as opposed to
the multiple chambers that remain under the TCEA).
50

51

III. SEPARATION OF POWERS UNDER THE AUSTRALIAN
CONSTITUTION
Australia chose a tribunal model of adjudication, rather than a combined-function
model, largely because it was heavily influenced by British practice. However,
another reason for the development of the Australian tribunal system was the
approach taken by the Australian High Court to constitutional separation of powers.
The Australian constitution drew heavily on the separation-of-powers provisions of
the U.S. constitution (while preserving British-style parliamentary supremacy). For
that reason, Australia might have chosen to follow the American “combined
functions” model for administrative adjudication. However, Australia did not and
could not adopt the combined-function model because it maintains a much stronger
version of separation of powers than does the U.S. Under the Australian approach to
separation of powers, the judicial branch cannot exercise executive functions
(sometimes referred to as “administrative functions”) and the executive branch
cannot exercise judicial functions. Of course, the terms “executive,”
“administrative,” and “judicial” are hardly self-defining and the application of these
vague criteria has caused much difficulty.
52

A. The American Approach toward Delegation of Adjudicatory Power to NonArticle III Judges
American constitutional law takes a more pragmatic approach to separation of
powers than does Australian law. American doctrine tolerates statutory arrangements
by which the powers of the three branches are shared with the others, but guards
against statutes that enable Congress to broaden its own powers at the expense of
other branches or that unduly impair the ability of other branches to carry out their
assigned functions.
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discretionary decisions as well. Craig, supra note 39 at 269-71; see also Sir William Wade Christopher
Forsyth, Administrative Law 10th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 793-800. Further
explication of the scope of review by the upper Tribunal and by the courts is beyond the scope of this
article.
See Craig, supra note 39 at 271-73; Wade & Forsyth, ibid. at 780.
See Timothy Endicott, Administrative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 435-38, 451-52.
In addition, there is the possibility of judicial review through prerogative writ in the High Court if
appeal to the Court of Appeal is denied.
R v. Kirby; Ex Parte Boilermakers‟ Society of Australia, (1956) 94 CLR 254, 271 [Boilermakers‟], aff‟d by
Privy Council, Attorney General (Commonwealth) v The Queen (1957) 95 CLR 529.
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Thus it has long been clear that Congress can delegate judicial power to an
administrative agency, at least with respect to so-called “public rights.” Broadly
speaking, “public rights” involve disputes between private parties and the United
States. Typical public rights disputes involve claims to government benefits or
enforcement of the tax laws, as well as federal law enforcement against private parties
and enforcement of the immigration laws.
In the leading case of Crowell v. Benson, the Supreme Court upheld the delegation
to a federal agency to adjudicate a case of “private rights,” meaning a private-versusprivate dispute. Crowell involved an employee‟s claim against the employer for
workers‟ compensation in a maritime dispute. This was a statutory right of action as
opposed to a traditional common law claim. It remained unclear whether Congress
could assign the adjudication of such traditional tort or contract claims to a nonArticle III adjudicator. In Northern Pipeline, the Court held that the adjudication of a
traditional private-versus-private contract dispute could not be delegated to a nonArticle III adjudicator. Clearly, the Court was concerned that Congress might strip
the federal courts of large portions of their traditional jurisdiction by assigning broad
swatches of it to agencies or other non-Article III bodies and might even preclude
judicial review of their determinations.
Northern Pipeline was swiftly undermined by later decisions. In Thomas, the Court
upheld a system of agency-operated binding arbitration of claims by a prior pesticide
registrant for compensation arising out of the use by a later registrant of the prior
registrant‟s data. The key was that the private right was newly created and closely
integrated into a public regulatory scheme. Finally, in Schor, the Court approved a
delegation to an agency of the power to decide a contract counterclaim that was
ancillary to a statutory system of reparations in favour of customers who claimed that
their brokers had violated the rules. If the agency could not adjudicate the contract
counterclaim asserted by the broker, the entire system of reparations would have
collapsed. The language of the Schor decision stresses pragmatism and the balancing
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However, it may be that “public rights” include “a seemingly „private‟ right that is so closely
integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with
limited involvement by the Article III judiciary.” Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54
(1989).
Supra note 2.
Crowell also held that “jurisdictional” facts determined by the agency in a private-rights case were
subject to de novo redetermination in federal court. Within short order, however, this portion of the
Crowell decision was quietly abandoned, although it has never been formally overruled. See Reuel E.
Schiller, “The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative
Law” (2007) 106 Mich L Rev 399 at 410-12, 438-39.
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). The statute assigned the
trial of all issues in a bankruptcy case, including breach of contract issues, to bankruptcy judges who
lack life tenure. Subsequently, the Court applied the Northern Pipeline ruling to a case challenging the
constitutionality of bankruptcy court jurisdiction to adjudicate preferential transfer claims.
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). In Schor, the statute empowered an
agency to award reparations to customers from commodity brokers for violations of the statute or
regulations. The agency adopted regulations providing that brokers could submit counterclaims
against their customers when the customer sought reparations. An alternative ground for the
decision in Schor is that the customer waived the right to have the counterclaim tried in federal court.
Ibid at 849-50.
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of all factors in determining whether the assignment of a particular type of private
right claim is improper.
59

B. Australian Agencies Cannot Exercise Judicial Powers
In the remarkable Wheat case of 1915, the High Court of Australia firmly
committed the country to strict separation of judicial and executive powers. The
Australian Constitution of 1900 provided for an Inter-State Commission [ISC] to
regulate trade between the states and it explicitly provided that the ISC would have
“such powers of adjudication and administration as the Parliament deems
necessary.” The American Interstate Commerce Commission (created in 1887) was
clearly one of the models for the ISC along with some British regulatory agencies.
However, the High Court held that the ISC could not exercise judicial power. If an
agency could not be given judicial powers by an explicit constitutional provision,
Parliament certainly lacked authority to delegate such powers by a statute. The Wheat
case sounded the death knell in Australia for the combined function approach to
administrative adjudication.
In the leading Boilermakers‟ case, the Court made clear that judicial and nonjudicial powers could not be combined in the same body. The case concerned the
Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, a labor arbitration body created by Parliament
under a specific constitutional authority. The High Court held that the Court of
Conciliation and Arbitration could render arbitral awards, as arbitration is not a
judicial function. However, that Court could not be given the power to enforce its
own awards through an injunction or a contempt order, since enforcement of an
arbitral award against a union is a judicial function. Apparently the court that is
called upon to enforce an arbitral award is not expected to retry the merits; the
arbitral decision established the “factum” on which judicial enforcement depends.
Wheat seemed to rule out adjudication by a combined-function agency and
Boilermakers indicated that an agency could not be given power to enforce its own
decisions. As a result, Australian legislators designed specialized adjudicatory tribunals
that are independent of the department that made the underlying disputed decision
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The Court stated “we have also been faithful to our Article III precedents, which counsel that brightline rules cannot effectively be employed to yield broad principles applicable in all Article III
inquiries. . . . Rather, due regard must be given in each case to the unique aspects of the
congressional plan at issue and its practical consequences in light of the larger concerns that underlie
Article III.” Ibid at 857. For discussion of the incoherence of the U.S. law relating to delegation of
adjudicatory powers, see Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, “Government Benefits and the Rule
of Law: Toward a Standards-Based Theory of Judicial Review” (2006) 58 Admin L Rev 499 at 50724; Richard Fallon, “Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III” (1988) 101 Harv
L Rev 916 at, 918-33.
New South Wales v Commonwealth, (1915)20 C.L.R. 54.
Australian Constitution. paras.101, 102.
Cane remarks that the Australian version of separation of powers effectively prevented the creation
of combined function agencies. As a result, adjudication by agencies engaged in regulatory functions
is unknown in Australia. Cane, supra note 6 at 58.
Supra note 52.
See Australian Constitution. para. 51(xxxv) (empowering Parliament to make laws with respect to
“Conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending
beyond the limits of any one State”).
See Waterside Workers‟ Federation of Australia v JW Alexander Ltd. (1918)25 CLR 434, 464-65.
Similarly, see R v Davison, 90 CLR 353 (1954), holding that the decision that a person is bankrupt is a
judicial function that cannot be delegated to the registrar of the bankruptcy court.
See Boilermakers‟, supra note 52.
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and that lack enforcement power. After Boilermakers, Australian courts had to decide
precisely what executive agencies could not do. As Boilermakers suggests, an agency
cannot have the power to enforce its own judgment through the normal process of
judicial execution. The clearest authority to this effect is the Brandy case involving
anti-discrimination law. Under the law prior to 1992, the Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Commission [HREOC] could adjudicate discrimination cases but its
decisions were not legally enforceable. A victim of discrimination had to make a
fresh application to the Federal Court which, after a rehearing, could make such
orders as it thought fit. In 1992, Parliament amended the Act so that HREOC‟s
determination could be “registered” with the Federal Court. If the losing party
sought review, the court “may review all issues of fact and law” but no new evidence
could be introduced. If the losing party did not seek judicial review (or if the Federal
Court affirmed HREOC‟s decision), the HREOC decision (which might call for
monetary damages or specific relief) became enforceable like any other judgment.
In Brandy, the High Court invalidated these amendments, holding that a
proceeding is inevitably judicial if the tribunal that renders it has the power to enforce
it by execution or otherwise. Consequently, the case would have to be retried in
federal court before the decision could be enforced. The Brandy decision
immobilized Australian anti-discrimination law and, if it were read broadly, could
have cast doubt on the constitutional validity of other administrative adjudicatory
tribunals whose decisions are more or less self-enforcing.
To an American reader, the Brandy decision seems hopelessly formalistic. Given
that Boilermakers accepted the idea that an executive arbitral decision could be the
factum on which judicial enforcement rested, the rejection of HREOC‟s registration
mechanism seems unfounded. The Brandy decision appears to reflect a judicial
distaste for anti-discrimination law (or perhaps doubts about the impartiality of
HREOC) and it may reflect judicial disinclination to part with jurisdiction over a type
of case that resembles traditional tort litigation.
Both before and after Brandy, the High Court has repeatedly been forced to
answer the question of whether a particular package of adjudicatory and enforcement
powers delegated to a particular agency adds up to an exercise of judicial power.
This unfortunate result is inevitable, since the decisions are defending a distinction
that does not exist. The realities of modern administration have forced the High
Court to retreat steadily from the absolutist separation of powers rhetoric of cases
like Wheat, Boilermakers and Brandy. In the contemporary world, government agencies
are empowered to adjudicate a huge range of regulatory and welfare disputes between
private parties or between private parties and government. Administrative
adjudication of such disputes is clearly necessary to the functioning of modern
society. Courts could not remotely handle this enormous body of adjudicatory
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Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, (1995)183 CLR 245.
183 CLR at 267-71 (rejecting the argument that the registration provision should be interpreted so
that the decision subject to enforcement was made by the Federal Court rather than HREOC).
As the Court remarked in the Tasmanian Breweries decision: “The uncertainties that are met with arise,
generally if not always, from the fact that there is a „borderland in which judicial and administrative
functions overlap” . . . so that for reasons depending upon general reasoning, analogy, or history,
some powers which may be appropriately be treated as administrative when conferred on an
administrative functionary may just as appropriately be seen in a judicial aspect and be validly
conferred upon a federal court.” R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex Parte Tasmanian Breweries Proprietary
Ltd.,(1970) 123 CLR 361, 373 (op. of Kitto, J).
As the High Court recognized in 1926, “[I]f a legislative provision of the present nature [for a
taxation tribunal] be forbidden, then a very vast and at present growing page of necessary
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work. Administrative decisions are largely self-enforcing but the enforcement
process sometimes requires judicial assistance. Given this array of administrative
dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms, it is impossible to say which
adjudicatory decisions are “administrative” and which are “judicial.”
Notwithstanding cases like Boilermakers and Brandy, the High Court has in fact
approved various administrative adjudication schemes that are largely self-enforcing.
Some of these cases involve schemes in which the primary agency decision is in
question; others involve merit review schemes. But all of them are enforceable
(either against private parties or against government) without the need for de novo
judicial consideration. Thus agencies can remove a trademark from the registry of
trademarks. They can adjudicate tax disputes. They can adjudicate pension
They can establish child support obligations.
Most importantly,
disputes.
administrative tribunals can invalidate contracts or order relief against unfair business
practices such as monopolization. Under the Trade Practices Act, the ACT can declare
a contract unenforceable or restrain a practice if the contract or practice is “contrary
to the public interest” and such decisions have the force of law. The Takeovers
Panel can invalidate a corporate acquisition. Courts are prohibited from affording
judicial remedies but have jurisdiction to enforce the Panel‟s decisions. At this
point, an outside reader is baffled; how, if at all, are such responsibilities and
enforcement powers different from those involved in Brandy or Boilermakers?
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constitutional means by which Parliament may in its discretion meet . . . the requirements of a
progressive people, must, in my opinion, be considered as substantially obliterated. . . .” Federal
Commissioner of Taxation v Munro, (1926) 38 CLR 153, 178 [Munro] (opinion of Isaacs, J. upholding the
validity of the taxation Board of Review), affirmed by Privy Council sub. nom. Shell Co. of Australia Ltd.
v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1930) 44 CLR 530.
R v Quinn; Ex Parte Consolidated Foods Corp. (1977)138 CLR 1, 12.
Munro, supra note 71. Only a year earlier the High Court had invalidated a very similar tax tribunal.
Parliament immediately acted to create a new tribunal. The primary difference between them
was that no “appeal on law points” to the High Court was provided for. Thus, Parliament
managed to transfer tax adjudication from the judicial to the administrative branch by reducing
the ability of taxpayers to obtain judicial review of the tribunal‟s decision.
Attorney-General v Breckler, (1999)197 CLR 83, 110-12. The decision turned on several factors. The
pension plan provided that the trustees would be bound by a decision of the Superannuation
Complaints Tribunal, so it was not necessary to rely on judicial enforcement. Moreover, it was
possible to collaterally attack the tribunal‟s decisions in court.
Luton v Lessels, (2002) 210 CLR 333, 360 (the administrative determination of liability creates a
“factum” by reference to which the statute creates rights for the future which then are enforced by
resort to courts).
Tasmanian Breweries, supra note 69, at 372-78 (Kitto, J. – the “public interest” standard is too
subjective to be characterized as judicial); 401-03 (Windeyer, J. – the public interest standard is
remote from standards courts apply, relying on American authorities upholding judicial delegations to
agencies) 408-09; (Owen, J. - Tribunal lacks enforcement powers).
Alinta, supra note 14. Although the High Court was unanimous in this case, there are six separate
opinions that rely on an uneasy combination of different reasons for finding the Panel‟s power to be
non-judicial. These include the fact that the Panel takes account of policy considerations that are
different from the kind of policy determinations made by common law courts; that the Panel‟s order
creates “new rights and obligations;” that historical analysis shows that it would be inappropriate for a
court to undertake review of takeovers; that the displacement of contract rights from a takeover
agreement is different from what happens in a contract case in court; that the Panel‟s order provides
the “factum” which courts would then be required to enforce; and numerous other factors
that strike an outside reader as wholly lacking in analytical substance.
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C. Australian Courts Cannot Exercise Executive Power
As discussed above, Australian executive departments cannot exercise judicial
power. Just as importantly, a federal court cannot exercise executive power.
Providing merits review of the factual or the discretionary aspects of a government
decision is considered an executive power. Consequently, a court is precluded from
providing such review. Australians believe that it would be deeply improper for a
court to interfere in the substance of executive decisionmaking by substituting its
judgments about factual or discretionary matters for the judgment of an agency. Yet
it is plain that some form of merits review of the factual and discretionary basis of the
adjudicatory decisions of government agencies must be provided. Since courts
cannot supply merits review of factual or discretionary determinations because of
separation of powers constraints, such review must occur within the executive
branch.
The epochal Kerr Committee report of 1971 explicitly determined courts could
not provide merits review of administrative decisions. Consequently, it recommended
adoption of a peak merits review tribunal and the creation of the AAT implemented
that recommendation.
78

IV. THE AAT IN PRACTICE
The Australian AAT is an attractive model. It has attained a high degree of
legitimacy in Australia, as shown by the spread of tribunals in both the
Commonwealth and in the Australian states. Before considering whether the
Australian model might be transplanted to the U.S., a more detailed examination of
the pros and cons of the AAT is in order.
A. The AAT’s Procedures
The AAT‟s organic statute states that “[i]n carrying out its functions, the Tribunal
must pursue the objective of providing a mechanism of review that is fair, just,
economical, informal and quick.” Of course, as Professor Creyke has pointed out,
“[c]omplying with this litany of adjectives has created difficulties...not least because
they are internally inconsistent.” The procedures are supposed to be “conducted
with as little formality and technicality, and with as much expedition, as the
requirements of this Act and of every other relevant enactment and a proper
consideration of the matters before the Tribunal permit”; moreover, “the Tribunal is
not bound by the rules of evidence but may inform itself on any matter in such
manner as it thinks appropriate.” But as the famous Mathews v. Eldridge balancing
test for measuring due process in the U.S. implicitly acknowledges, accuracy, fairness
and efficiency values are often at odds.
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See Cane, supra note 6 at 60-67, 145-49. He argues that the Kerr Commission missed the mark,
because the vast majority of administrative decisions do not involve determinations of policy or
applications of discretion. Instead, they involve application of specific detailed and formal
principles to the facts. In that respect, they are just the same as the kinds of decisions courts make
and review all the time. So judicial review of the vast majority of administrative decisions would not
have offended separation of powers. When the AAT does confront important issues of policy, it
generally defers to the executive, which further undercuts the reasoning of the Kerr Committee. See
discussion in the text, infra, at notes 118-24.
AAT Act para. 2A.
Creyke, supra note 6 at 94.
AAT Act paras. 33(1)(b)&(c).
See 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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1. AAT’s Mix of Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures
As mentioned before, the AAT provides a blend of adversarial and inquisitorial
process, while the specialized tribunals tend to be closer to the inquisitorial end of
the spectrum.
83

84

(a) Pro-activity in Obtaining Evidence
One issue is whether the AAT sufficiently uses its inquisitorial powers to require
submission of material documents from the parties or even to gather other
information, especially where the applicant is unrepresented.
Professor Cane concludes that the AAT could do more: “on the whole...it seems
that Australian merits tribunals rarely obtain information other than from or through
the applicant and the decision-maker.” In part, as he acknowledges, this is a resource
issue, and without the availability of staff to find witnesses or information not
produced by the parties, “the most that tribunals are likely to do is to invite,
encourage, or perhaps, require, parties to provide additional evidence.” At any rate
the law does not require more at this point: although Creyke and McMillan point to
several tribunal decisions that have been held invalid for failing to consider whether
additional evidence was needed, or seeking clarity on matters deemed unclear or
obscure, they conclude that “the settled principle is...that there is no general legal
duty on a tribunal to conduct inquiries.” A discussion paper for the Australian Law
Reform Commission proposed an amendment to the AAT Act to require the tribunal
to be take a more proactive investigative role in cases involving unrepresented parties,
but the proposal was never formally recommended.
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See the High Court‟s description in of the AAT‟s procedures in Bushell v Repatriation Commission (1992)
175 CLR 408, 424-5:
Proceedings before the A.A.T. may sometimes appear to be adversarial when the
Commission chooses to appear to defend its decision or to test a claimant‟s case but
in substance the review is inquisitorial. Each of the Commission, the Board and the
A.A.T. is an administrative decision-maker, under a duty to arrive at the correct or
preferable decision in the case before it according to the material before it. If the
material is inadequate, the Commission, the Board or the A.A.T. may request or
itself compel the production of further material. The notion of onus of proof,
which plays so important a part in fact-finding in adversarial proceedings before
judicial tribunals, has no part to play in these administrative proceedings.
Examples of inquisitorial practices in the specialized tribunals include the RRT‟s research unit, which
compiles “country information” reports, briefings prepared by the MRT‟s “case officers,” and the
appointment to the SSAT of medical specialists and former departmental officials. Creyke &
McMillan, supra note 6 at 156. For a concise discussion of the differences between adversarial and
inquisitorial processes, see Margaret Allars, “Neutrality, the Judicial Paradigm and Tribunal
Procedure” (1991) 13 Sydney L Rev 377 at 381-85. For a comparison of adversarial and
inquisitorial approaches in environmental assessment of land development, see Andrew Edgar,
“Participation and Responsiveness in Merits Review of Polycentric Decisions: A Comparison of
Development Assessment Appeals” (2010) 27 Environmental & Planning Law Journal 36.
See the AAT Act, paras. 37, 38(describing the Tribunal‟s powers to require the submission of
documents and other materials).
Cane, supra note 6 at 241.
Creyke & McMillan, supra note 6 at 163, citing Azzi v Minister of Immigration and Multicultural
Affairs (2002) 125 FCR 48, and Budworth v Repatriation Commission (2001) 33 AAR 48.
Creyke & McMillan, supra note 6 at 163, citing Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Singh (1997)
44 ALD 487. See also Creyke, supra note 6 at 93 (“Courts, too have been slow to impose an
obligation on a tribunal to undertake independent inquiries, even given tribunals‟ ostensible
inquisitorial role.”).
Ibid., citing “Managing Justice”, Report No 89, 2000, paras. 9.53-9.55.
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(b) Handling of Expert Evidence
Since it is not a court, the AAT can be more flexible in its receipt of expert
evidence. Some tribunal members obviously have expertise of their own, and “it is
generally accepted that tribunal members should be freer than judges to draw on their
own personal knowledge and to „take notice‟ of information not presented by the
parties.” However, parties need to be given a chance to object to the taking of
official notice or information obtained from third parties. This is no different from
the APA‟s rules on ALJ hearings in the U.S. However, tribunals sometimes have
been creative in arranging for concurrent presentation of expert evidence in so-called
hot tubs; instead of experts presenting evidence individually, a number of experts are
brought together in one session at which areas of agreement and difference can be
explored and developed by discussion and questioning between the experts
themselves.
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(c) Other Rules of Evidence
The AAT Act states that “the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence, but
may inform itself in such manner as it thinks appropriate” – a standard that is even
more unrestrictive than that of the U.S. APA.
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(d) New Evidence
It is commonplace for new evidence to arise during the period between the
agency decision and the tribunal hearing. Merits review tribunals review the facts as
they exist at the time of the review, not at the time of the agency decision. This
“contemporaneous review” presents its own set of problems. By the time of the
review, the agency may have changed its “administrative outlook,” but, in contrast to
the U.S., the agency cannot revise its decision, because it has already become the
responsibility of the tribunal. Or the facts may have changed, and in many cases the
applicant can produce new evidence that was not before the decisionmaker below.
This “open record” concept also exists in U.S. social security and veterans‟ benefit
cases, and it has been criticized for creating incentives to hold back evidence. The
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Cane, supra note 6 at 240, n.114, citing J.A. Smillie, “The Problem of „Official Notice‟: Reliance by
Administrative Tribunals on the Personal Knowledge of Their Members,” (1975) Public Law 64.
See Pearson, supra note 6 at 311 (“Procedural fairness requires the disclosure of information coming
from [a tribunal member‟s expertise] where the tribunal proposes to reach a conclusion based on the
knowledge of a member of a particular fact, or relying on a particular expertise.”). She cites Tisdall v
Health Insurance Commission [2002] FCA 97, for this proposition, but adds that “It is troubling to note
that this does not always occur.” Ibid at n. 47.
See 5 U.S.C. para. 556(e).
Cane, supra note 6 at 243-244 (citing a survey of AAT members that indicated satisfaction with the
procedure, An Evaluation of the Use of Concurrent Evidence in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Nov.
2005), available online: AAT <http://www.a-a-t.gov.au/Speeches-Papers-And- Research/
Research/AAT-Concurrent-Evidence-ReportNovember2005.pdf.>)
AAT Act, para. 33(1)(c).
The APA‟s provision states: “Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the agency as
matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or repetitious evidence.” 5
U.S.C. para. 556(d).
See Creyke & McMillan, supra note 6 at 144; Shi, supra note 11.
Ibid.
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same concerns have been raised about the tribunals‟ open record policy. It should
be noted that intervening changes in the law may or may not be applied by the
tribunal, depending on whether the law itself states whether the change applies to
pending proceedings.
98

99

2. Role of the Agency Decisionmaker as a Party before the AAT
The responding agency must provide a statement of findings and reasons for its
decision and disclose any other document that it has (or controls) that is relevant to
the review.
Somewhat surprisingly, its overall responsibility is to “assist the
Tribunal to make its decision,” not to act in an adversary fashion. This is consistent
with the AAT‟s merits review responsibility to make the “correct or preferable”
decision, but it must be difficult for the agency representative to undergo this
“attitudinal adjustment.”
On the other hand, in Hayes the Federal Court overturned an AAT ruling in a
workers‟ compensation case that a subsequently discovered agency video of the applicant
should have been disclosed to the applicant prior to its introduction in the hearing so
as to allow sufficient time to prepare for cross-examination. Subsequent decisions of
the AAT, however, have distinguished this Federal Court decision, one of which
commented that “the principal of trial by ambush … has never held sway in this
Tribunal and I hope it never will.
100

101

102

103

3. Burden-of-Proof Considerations
Given the roles of the parties, how do burden-of-proof considerations factor into
the AAT‟s decision? Even though, “as a practical matter...it is in the interest of a
party to [present] evidence to persuade the tribunal,” it seems to be the case that
with respect to the tribunals, “it is not appropriate to talk in terms of a formal onus
or burden of proof,” unless an underlying statute contains one. This is because “the
AAT is required...to make its own decision in place of the administrator.”
But this rationale tends to beg the question, and Professor Pearson explains that
the question of how tribunals “proceed when left in a state of uncertainty” is that
they generally “turn to the applicable legislation, which will usually be worded in
terms requiring the decision-maker to reach a state of satisfaction on a particular
issue...” Evaluating whether this requirement has been met obviously requires the
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Ibid at 145 (suggesting that “an agency is likely to be disgruntled where a decision is set aside, or a
hearing is held unnecessarily, as a result of fresh evidence that might as easily have been presented to
the decision-maker”).
Ibid at 146. See also Shi, supra note 11 (holding that the AAT is permitted to consider new evidence).
AAT Act para. 37 (1AAA).
Ibid at para. 33(1AA). See also Cane, supra note 6 at 244. In the SSAT and MRT, the government
does not appear as a party (similar to many U.S. benefits adjudications). Creyke, supra note 6 at 92.
Australian Postal Commission v Hayes (1989) 23 FCR 320; excerpted in Creyke & McMillan, supra note 6
at 164-65. The court determined that the AAT Act para. 37 requirement that all relevant material be
disclosed before the hearing did not require the disclosure of subsequently discovered evidence
that was not before the decisionmaker.
Re Taxation Appeals NT94-281-NT94-291 (1995) 21 AAR 275, excerpted in Creyke & McMillan, supra
note 6 at 166.
Ibid at 171.
See Pearson, supra note 6 at 309.
McDonald v Director-General of Social Security (1984) 1 FCR 354 excerpted in Creyke & McMillan, supra
note 6 at 172).
See Pearson, supra note 6 at 309-10.
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tribunal to give careful attention to the findings and reasons provided by the
decisionmaker, but it can be especially difficult for the tribunal to “balance
assessment of credibility based on oral evidence with what might at first appear to be
more „reliable‟ documentary material such as...information prepared by government
agencies.”
In the end, the “balance of probability” standard is “ordinarily the
appropriate standard to be applied by an administrative tribunal.”
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4. Alternative Dispute Resolution [ADR] Techniques
The AAT and other tribunals rely heavily on techniques to avoid formal hearings.
To begin with, occasionally the tribunal may determine that the papers filed by the
respondent agency allow for a favorable decision for the applicant “on the papers.”
The AAT may also decide to proceed on the papers with both parties‟ consent.
Many cases also settle, through party conferences with an AAT member, or
through other ADR processes such as mediation. In 2008-09, the AAT resolved
5838 cases without a hearing and provided only 1393 hearings. Thus only 19% of
the cases lodged in the AAT actually resulted in a hearing. But the AAT must agree
to the disposition because “[o]nce an application for review has been made, the AAT
alone can bring the proceedings to an end.” This also prevents an agency from
trying to “pull back” an appeal.
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5. Decisionmaking and Opinion-Writing
The AAT‟s decisions from 1976 to the present are available on line on the
Australasian Legal Information Institute website. According to Professor Creyke,
decisions of the AAT, because it is not a court, are not precedential. However,
issues of consistency and following precedent can occur with respect to prior tribunal
rulings on both legal and factual questions. Although AAT decisions on legal
interpretation questions are subject to judicial review, sometimes a case will involve a
legal issue that has been decided in an earlier unappealed AAT case. The AAT‟s
Deputy President has opined that in that situation the AAT should follow the
decision in the earlier case, especially if the decision was made by a presidential
member, although the member deciding the later case could note his or her
disagreement with the result.
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6. Generalized vs. Specialized Expertise
Given that over 400 statutes provide for AAT jurisdiction, and that its members
are a mix of lawyers and non-lawyers and full-timers and part-timers, one might
legitimately wonder whether the Tribunal can handle cases from agencies that present
difficult and technical issues. This objection has also been leveled at federal judges in
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Creyke & McMillan, supra note 6 at 171.
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Ibid at para. 34A. See also Cane, supra note 6 at 246-49.
AAT Annual Report 2008-09, App. 3, supra note 22.
Cane, supra note 6 at 246-47.
See online: Australasian Legal Information Institute <http://www.aust-lii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/A-A-T-A>.
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the United States who hear appeals from a multitude of agencies. But the difference
is that U.S. judicial review of disputes about fact findings and exercises of discretion
is limited to a “reasonableness” form of review (the substantial evidence test for
formal adjudication and the arbitrary and capricious test for informal adjudication).
Similarly, in the U.S., judicial review of questions of law is also usually quite
deferential to the agency‟s interpretation of statutes and of its own regulations.
The literature on Australia‟s tribunals does not appear to view this as a serious
concern even though AAT members are not provided with legal or technical
assistants. Perhaps the AAT‟s ability to call on the decisionmaking agency for
additional documents and to call upon the agency‟s counsel to assist the tribunal in
making the “correct or preferable” decision is regarded as giving the AAT members
the tools they need. In addition, the AAT does not review tribunal decisions relating
to takeovers and trade practices that might present issues beyond the ken of many
AAT members nor does it review most decisions relating to immigration and refugee
policy, which may reflect political considerations. Finally, note that several high
volume specialized tribunals (the SSAT and VRB) siphon many cases away from the
AAT (although the AAT provides merits review of challenged SSAT and VRB
decisions that are unfavorable to the applicant).
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7. Following Governmental Policy
Whether tribunals must follow agency policy presents an important and recurring
issue. This is also a question that confronts U.S. ALJs. In Australia, an influential
AAT decision, Drake No. 2 held that the AAT should apply a presumption in favour
of relevant government policies (assuming that the “policy” does not conflict with
“hard law” such as a statute or regulation). The AAT should depart from policy only
for “cogent reasons,” such as injustice in an individual case, but not because it
disagrees with the policy in general. One reason for deference to policy is to achieve
consistency between unappealed decisions and AAT decisions. Another is to keep
the AAT out of politics and avoid clashes with government departments; its job is to
adjudicate, not set government policy.
These generalities leave open questions about whether the tribunal‟s duty to
depart from government policy only for cogent reasons is affected by the level of the
policymaker (ministerial, departmental, or lower) or the procedure used to issue the
policy (after public consultation or not). Andrew Edgar has focused on the
distinction, often suggested by academic commentators and found in case law,
between “high” and “low” policy. High policy comes from the minister, is subject to
“ministerial responsibility” and is scrutinized by Parliament; Drake 2 requires the
AAT to follow high policy. Low policy, on the other hand, comes from soft law
issued by the department. The AAT either ignores or considers but feels free to
redetermine low policy. Edgar criticizes this distinction and suggests that the AAT
should defer to both high and low policy, because the failure to defer to soft law
results in inconsistent decisionmaking by different AAT panels and the substitution
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See Andrew Edgar, Tribunals and administrative policies: Does the high or low policy distinction
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See Cane, supra note 6 at 169 (suggesting that reweighing factors in reviewing a discretionary decision
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of a less informed for a more informed determination of appropriate policy. He
argues that the AAT lacks the relevant information to make proper judgments about
policy because often the rationale for the policy is not articulated in the department‟s
decision, which is specific to the facts of the case. Moreover, he contends that lack of
deference produces an accountability problem because the AAT‟s decision on policy
is not reviewable either in court or as a political matter (other than through
parliamentary legislation).
Nor is Edgar any more enamored of a distinction based on whether or not the
policy was developed after public consultation. He observes that where consultation
has taken place, agencies can “cherry-pick” from among the comments that are
“consistent with their pre-determined view and ignore other submissions,” and that
tribunals would not know when this sort of “charade” had taken place. He also
opines that some agency policies promulgated without consultations (including
interpretive rules) are quite legitimate and should be followed by tribunals.
Professor Cane takes a more positive view of tribunal review of policy that is only
reflected in soft law. He believes that these policies are certainly relevant
considerations for the tribunal, but they are not binding. More broadly, in his view,
the AAT is entitled to refuse to apply a lawful policy not only because the policy leads
to injustice in the particular case but also because the AAT believes the policy is not
sound or wise. Moreover he goes on to say the AAT would also be “entitled to
enunciate a new policy, inconsistent with an existing policy, as the basis for varying a
decision or making a substitute decision.” He bases this conclusion on the fact that
the power to undertake merits review includes the power to substitute a correct or
preferable decision, and that must encompass the power to act inconsistently with
government policy. But he tempers his point by suggesting that the differences
between high and low policy or policies developed with and without consultation are
appropriate factors for the Tribunal to consider.
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V. WOULD THE AUSTRALIAN TRIBUNAL MODEL WORK IN THE
U.S.?
Could the U.S. borrow from the Australian experience? We believe that
something like the Australian tribunal model might work in the area of federal
benefits adjudication. These are mass justice systems in which decisionmakers must
deal with a heavy caseload of individual cases that largely turn on medical and
vocational issues and are not used as vehicles for the announcement of policy.
For purposes of this article, we limit our proposal to an independent U.S. Social
Security Tribunal [SST], which would be similar to the Australian SSAT. However,
we also believe that policymakers should consider whether the SST might be
expanded to cover adjudication arising under some or all of the other federal benefit
programs, including schemes administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs
and the Department of Labor. If that were to occur, the result would be a federal
benefits tribunal of generalized jurisdiction, much like the AAT. Our discussion does
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not include the judicial review stage, but we also believe that policymakers should
consider establishing a Social Security Court to review SST decisions.
The hearing stage of the social security adjudication system has encountered deep
problems. Most importantly, it struggles with an overwhelming caseload. A
combative atmosphere between the Social Security Administration [SSA] and its ALJs
has lingered for years. SSA must manage its ALJs to improve the efficiency, accuracy,
and consistency of the decisionmaking process. In the past, however, some of these
management decisions were explicitly (and wrongly) designed to reduce the number
of beneficiaries on the disability rolls and to reduce the percentage of ALJ decisions
in favor of claimants. This has given ALJs and lawyers that represent claimants a
basis for condemning SSA management initiatives as subversive of ALJ
independence.
On the other hand, it must be recognized that many of the problems of SSA
adjudication arise out of problems with the ALJ program itself. The general process
by which ALJs are hired and managed has often been criticized. Under the APA,
ALJs are hired without a probationary period and receive indefinite tenure.
Application of the veterans‟ preference laws effectively excludes many non-veterans
and creates gender and racial disparities. The Office of Personnel Management
[OPM] runs the hiring process which is cumbersome and bureaucratic; OPM has
often neglected or mismanaged this task. The system requires a hiring agency to
choose from among the top three on the list offered to it by the OPM, thus
foreclosing any exercise of judgment by the agency. This rigid ALJ selection system
is circumvented by many agencies which cherry-pick from the judges already working
for the SSA. Alone among all federal civil servants, ALJs are exempt from
performance evaluations and it is extremely difficult to discipline or discharge them,
especially for low productivity.
The ALJ selection and disciplinary protections arise from explicit provisions of
the APA. The APA struck many political compromises, one of which was to leave
the judges housed within agencies for which they decide cases while constructing a
set of protections for their independence within that agency. However, if the ALJs
functioned within a tribunal separate from the agency that made the decision under
review, many of those protections would become unnecessary.
126

127

128

129

130

126

127

128
129

130

Lubbers has written in favour of a specialized Social Security court to remove the vast number of
Social Security appeals from federal district courts. Lubbers & Verkuil, supra note 1. The newly
created English Upper Tribunal, which is treated as a court of record and provides for an appeal of
the decisions of first-tier tribunals, is a move in the direction of a specialized court that the U.S.
would do well to study. See accompanying text at notes 48-50.
See Ass‟n of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C.1984), amended 1985 WL
71829 (July 2, 1985) (finding SSA program of reviewing decisions of administrative law judges with
high rates of allowing disability benefit claims to be of dubious legality).
See generally Richard E. Levy, Social Security Disability Determinations: Recommendations for
Reform, (1990) BYUL Rev 461 at 497-502.
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System of Performance Evaluation for ALJs” (1994) 7 Admin L J Am U 589.
Many have urged procedural reforms of Social Security adjudication and judicial review. Levy, for
example, proposes legislation that would remove Social Security ALJs from the SSA and make them
an independent corps; he also proposes replacing federal district court review of ALJ decisions with
an Article I court of disability appeals that is similar to the Court of Veterans‟ Appeals. See Levy,
supra note 128 at 528-37. Similarly, Lubbers & Verkuil propose an Article I Social Security Court,
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An SST would be independent of the SSA. Its judges could continue to provide
informal, inquisitorial methods when that is appropriate. At present, the SSA is
unrepresented in disability cases, so the ALJ wears multiple hats (making sure that
both the SSA and applicant‟s position is properly presented, then deciding the case).
Of course, the SST judges would be required to follow SSA regulations as well as
properly issued soft law policy statements or interpretations propounded by the
Commissioner. Decisions by the SST would be final administrative decisions. The
next step would be judicial review, possibly limited to questions of law. Of course,
both the applicant for benefits and SSA could seek judicial review of SST decisions.
Creation of the SST would enable a reconsideration of the various management
issues currently plaguing the system of social security adjudication. Judges would
work for the SST, not for the SSA. As a result, there would be no need for the
APA‟s rigid controls on the hiring, supervision, compensation, evaluation, and
discharge of ALJs. The SST could hire its own judges using a rational, judgmentbased scheme to get the very best people available, as opposed to the wooden system
now used by the OPM. There could be probationary employment, to weed out
unsuitable judges early in their career. Judges‟ terms would be lengthy but not
indefinite and they could be removed only for good cause. There could be a series of
grades, so judges could work toward promotion and higher compensation. More
difficult cases could be assigned to more experienced judges. Some form of peer
review might be instituted to evaluate the work product of the judges. The chief
judge of the SST would manage the evaluation process. And if that evaluation
established that judges fell below reasonable standards of productivity, misbehaved
on the bench, or systematically ignored agency policies, appropriate remedial
measures could be put into place from mentoring or performance agreements, all the
way to dismissal after an appropriate hearing.
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of benefits decisions should be altered, but the creation of a Social Security court should be seriously
considered.
About half of the states and a number of large cities have adopted the central panel model. See Chris
Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Andrew Wistrich, “The „Hidden Judiciary‟: An Empirical Examination of
Executive Branch Justice (2009) 58 Duke L J 1477 at 1484 n. 29. Under that approach, the judge
hearing a case is independent of the agency that brings it. The judges are hired, assigned, managed,
and evaluated by an independent central panel agency. Our impression is that central panels have
worked well and are considered by the public and by lawyers to be more legitimate than
administrative judges embedded in the agency that is a party to the dispute. The central panel has
often been proposed and just as often rejected at the federal level, largely because of doubts that
central panel judges could effectively handle technical and difficult regulatory problems from
numerous agencies. See e.g. Jeffrey Lubbers, “A Unified Corps of ALJs: A Proposal to Test the Idea
at the Federal Level” (1981) 65 Judicature 266. However, we are proposing a centralization of
adjudication only for Social Security, so that the judges would need to master the law and practice
only from a single benefit program. Were the SST to be expanded to other federal benefit agencies,
such as those run by the VA and DOL, there would be an additional learning curve, but all of these
cases come down to medical and vocational issues, so any competent judge should be able to decide
cases accurately under any of the benefit schemes with only modest additional training.
In considering this proposal, Congress should decide whether to provide for an administrative appeal
of SST decisions, such as the AAT provides for SSAT decisions, the Upper Chamber provides in the
U.K., or the Appeals Council presently provides for a relatively small fraction of ALJ decisions in
Social Security cases. Our preliminary assessment of this issue is that a single administrative decision
by an independent ALJ is sufficient and a second level of administrative hearings absorbs resources
and causes delay without sufficient countervailing advantage. See Charles H. Koch & David A.
Koplow, “The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the Operation and Utility of the Social Security
Administration‟s Appeals Council” (1990) 17 Fla St U L Rev 199 at 296-98.
For obvious practical reasons, the existing ALJs working for the SSA would be grandfathered into the
new system. However, the existing ALJs would be subject to the new scheme of performance
evaluation.
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This proposal presents important issues of scale. Obviously the U.S. SST would
require a vastly larger corps of judges than the Australian AAT (with its 89 members)
or SSAT (with its 230 members). Yet the judges who would staff the SST are already
in place – the approximately 1200 skilled, experienced and conscientious Social
Security ALJs. They would be the nucleus of the SST.
The issue of consistency of decisions is always problematic in mass justice
situations. As Mashaw pointed out long ago, the only way to achieve reasonable
consistency of decisions among vast numbers of judges in a mass justice situation is
through management initiatives, not through an appeals council or through judicial
review of the procedure or the substance of such decisions. Those management
initiatives would be far more practicable and acceptable to the judges if they came
from an independent SST rather than from the SSA. For example, the SSA would
have to issue more regulations and high-level policy statements than it does today to
furnish guidance to SST judges. In addition, the SST might designate important
decisions by SST judges as precedent decisions that judges in later cases would be
required to follow.
The political feasibility of this proposal can be questioned. It is certainly possible
that ALJ organizations would dig in their heels against it, opposing anything that
might diminish their APA protections, or reduce the number of ALJs in their ranks.
Yet many ALJs have favored the creation of a federal, central panel that would
remove them from control of the agency that is party to the dispute. The SST would
produce exactly that form of independence, but it could be achieved only if the ALJs
were willing to accept a change to a new status as SST judges with whatever tailored
protections seemed most salient to that position.
Needless to say, many practical issues would arise in so radically changing the
structure of federal benefits adjudication, and there will be many compromises along
the way. Of course, the hearing process is just one step in a complex state/federal
process of disability claim adjudication and cannot be viewed in isolation from all the
other stages. This briefly sketched proposal does not address the details or the entire
process from state examiner scrutiny of a disability claim through federal court of
appeals review. We seek only to point out the advantages of an independent tribunal
structure in addressing some of the pathologies of the existing system of social
security adjudication.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Australian model shows that a generalized or specialized merits-review
tribunal can work efficiently and achieve legitimacy. It can command the respect of
all parties. It presents a successful alternative approach to the U.S. system of
embedded adjudicators. The fact that the U.K. has adopted a close variant of it is
evidence of its success. Whether the tribunal system could be adapted to the U.S. is
obviously debatable. However, in the area of mass adjudication of social benefits
programs, where policy matters rarely arise in individual cases, a centralized and
independent tribunal provides an intriguing and possibly adaptable model. This
experience should be carefully considered by American policymakers as they address
the seemingly intractable problem of federal benefits adjudication.
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